On book recommendations

I have recently come across a page on Goodreads listing my books. The website allows users to comment and recommend books - including offer 'stars' and so on in a format different from what can be found on Amazon.

Out of interest, how to readers receive recommendations on books? Is there another alternative?

What is the most important topic political scientists are not studying?

A recent piece in Perspectives on Politics by Professor Debra Javeline (found here) claims the answer is "adapting to climate change"(?). While I'm delighted to be noted as one of the good (or just better?) academics in the field, it is a pity she overlooked my other work in this area which does engage with the adaptation literature. Still, a thought-provoking piece even if I take issue with some of its claims.

Many thanks to the Open Univesity

. . . for the invitation to give a talk yesterday to their Philosophy Department's faculty seminar series (see details here). A great occasion with some terrific discussion I found highly beneficial.

Lights, Camera, Parliament!

I enjoyed taking part in this entry to the Lights, Camera, Parliament! national competition in the UK by the local Macmillan Academy - which won the runner up prize for secondary schools!

Studies in Global Justice

I'm delighted to have accepted a seat on the editorial board for the terrific book series Studies in Global Series led by Deen Chatterjee (Utah) and published by Springer. The series can be found here - with a dozen highly impressive (and important) contributions to the field already in print. Fellow board members include

Series Editor
Deen K. Chatterjee, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, U.S.A.

Editorial Board
Elizabeth Ashford, University of St. Andrews, U.K. Gillian Brock, University of Auckland, New Zealand Thom Brooks, Durham University, UK Simon Caney, Oxford University, UK Hiram E. Chodosh, University of Utah, U.S.A. Michael Doyle, Columbia University, U.S.A. Andreas Follesdal, University of Oslo, Norway Carol Gould, Hunter College, U.S.A. Virginia Held, City University of New York, U.S.A. Alison Jaggar, University of Colorado, U.S.A. Jon Mandle, SUNY, Albany, U.S.A. Richard W. Miller, Cornell University, U.S.A. Sanjay Reddy, The New School for Social Research, U.S.A. Joel H. Rosenthal, President, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs Kok-Chor Tan, University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Leif Wenar, King's College London, U.K. Veronique Zanetti, University of Bielefeld, Germany

Many thanks to Sciences Po-Paris

. . . for hosting my talk on "Punitive Restoration" as part of their Faculty Seminars. The discussing was absolutely terrific and I enjoyed every minute. One of the most enjoyable seminars I've had and highly impressive political theory taking place...

CFP: Tennessee Value and Agency Conference

Tennessee Value and Agency “TVA” Conference

2014 Conference – November 6-9, 2014
Practical Reason, Moral Judgment and Moral Sense, Sensibility and Sentiment in the Moral Life

Call For Abstracts

The 2014 Tennessee Value and Agency “TVA” Conference will take place November 6-9, 2014, on the University of Tennessee Campus, 1210 McClung Tower.  The conference will focus on (rethinking) the relationships between practical reason, moral judgment and moral
sense, sensibility and sentiment in the moral life, with an eye toward bringing structure and clarity to the aims and ambitions of current work in moral psychology and moral theory.  Keynote speakers will be Amelie Rorty (Tufts) and Talbot Brewer (UVA).  To have a paper considered for presentation, please submit a 500 word abstract (for a paper no longer than 40 minutes presentation time; if you plan to read your paper
this means a paper no more than 4000 words) by July 1, 2014, to 2014tvaconf@gmail.com.   The authors of abstracts/papers selected for presentation will be notified by August 15, 2014, and the conference program will be set and announced by September 1, 2014.   Please direct questions (but not abstracts) to David Reidy, dreidy@utk.edu.

The UT Philosophy Department’s annual Tennessee Value and Agency “TVA” Conference was inaugurated in the fall of 2012.  The Conference focuses on and advances work in two areas central to the Department’s research mission and graduate program:  value theory and agency/action theory.  Each year there is a conference theme, addressed by keynote speakers and roughly a dozen presenters selected by the conference organizers upon blind review of abstracts received in response to an internationally distributed call for abstracts.  (See the program for the 2012 “TVA” conference here, and the 2013 “TVA” conference here.)  The conference takes place over a Thursday through Sunday in the fall term.  The Conference is free and open to the public; students and scholars with special interests in the conference theme are encouraged to attend.  Participants and attendees enjoy high quality sessions with lively and productive discussions that typically spill over to receptions, meals, and so on.

Brooks quoted in new Labour Party consultation on criminal justice

Delighted to find I am quoted in the new UK Labour Party's policy consultation 'stronger, safer communities' on criminal justice policy here.

Readers will see my comment is connected to my work on what I've called punitive restoration - a reimagining of restorative justice as a kind of stakeholder justice with a greater diversity of options to better embed restorative justice in the criminal justice system. This idea of punitive restoration is an illustration of my novel unified theory of punishment which appears - in its own chapter - in my Punishment book. My work on the unified theory is cited as one of the top 100 Big Ideas for the Future at British universities as recognised by Research Councils UK.

Measuring journal impact in Canadian universities

There is an interesting document here -- using journal rankings data provided by this blog & the Leiter Reports -- worth a look.

Work for the Labour Party

. . . information about current posts can be found here.

Essay on Bradley's theory of punishment out soon in "Ethics"

Delighted to receive confirmation this morning that my essay about F. H. Bradley's theory of punishment and its relevance for sentencing policy today has been accepted by Ethics. Expect to see a draft uploaded onto SSRN shortly...

New paper on Hegel's political philosophy

. . . that is forthcoming in G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts (Acumen, 2014) edited by Michael Bauer can be found HERE. An abstract:

G. W. F. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is widely considered to be one of the most important contributions to the history of political philosophy, but also among the more complex.This chapter explains the central ideas to this ground-breaking work in an accessible approach that keeps technical terminology to a minimum. My aim is to clarify the distinctiveness of Hegel’s project and illuminate its widely influential discussions about freedom, recognition, the individual’s relation to the state and punishment to provide readers with a clear understanding of the Philosophy of Right within Hegel’s philosophical system through a close reading of this text.

Many thanks to the University of Hull and its Institue of Applied Ethics

. . . for hosting my talk on what's wrong with the UK's citizenship test and what should be done about it. A terrific occasion with great questions. Information about the event can be found here.

"Why Political Theory Matters"

. . . is now available on SSRN here. The abstract:

"Political theory matters. But why? Unfortunately, this simple claim about the importance of political theory may be controversial. This is because it runs contrary to what we might call a common misconception dominant in many informal circles that real world impact is the stuff of other sub-disciplines in political science and not made to order for political theorists. If we search for examples of politics as practiced, then too often an orthodox perspective for many political scientists is that theorists are expected to always come up short. One implication is that this orthodox view favours those sub-disciplines believed to offer some contribution to politics as practiced above the perceived importance of political theorists to politics as understood.

This contributes to a significant challenge for political theory. The perceived inability to contribute substantially to politics as practiced is not only a belief about political theory’s failure to engage with politics on the ground, but can undermine the one domain theorists are thought to have relevance, namely, to our understanding of politics if only abstractly. Some might argue: if political theorists cannot engage with the world and change it, then does political theory even matter?

This exceptionalism about political theory has additional negative effects. The launch of the so-called ‘impact agenda’ in British higher education is a recent example. The concern is that political theory is by its nature abstract and often thought to be substantially impractical. Political theorists more readily apply themselves to the consideration of ideas, but not always their relation to practices. The problem is that it has become more common to require evidence of research impact in funding applications and research assessments of departments. Political theorists are disadvantaged by this development and the impact agenda may threaten its future. In fact, this orthodox view is not only shared widely by most non-political theorists, but even by many political theorists, too.  

The orthodox view rests on a deep misunderstanding about the relation between ideas and practices. Political theorists can – and often do – affect practice. I offer a defence of political theory and its impact in this contribution. I will argue that the primary obstacle for political theorists is overcoming scepticism about the kind of impact theorists may offer. The issue is not about whether political theorists create impact, but rather the kinds of impact we should expect from political theorists.

This chapter present the impact that political theory has made and the opportunities for future work. It will consider the contributions made by leading political theorists to policy debates, the lessons learned from their successes, and how political theorists might further pursue existing and new opportunities to develop impact. The discussion will close with consideration of several potential threats that theorists should become more aware of in order to best avoid them. Political theorists should welcome – and not oppose – recent trends towards demonstrating impact because theorists (and perhaps the wider discipline of political science) can benefit."

New review of "Punishment"

. . . by Andrew Cornford for Rutger's Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Books can be found here. An excerpt:

"Thom Brooks’ Punishment is a rare thing: a book about a complex and important topic that is both of interest for experts and accessible to non-experts. In large part, the book is as described in its blurb: ‘a critical introduction to the philosophy of punishment’. Yet it is also more than a mere introductory text. Punishment presents Brooks’ own contribution to the debates that he introduces: his ambitious ‘unified theory’ of punishment, which advocates ‘punitive restoration’ as a response to violations of rights. For those already working in this field, Brooks’ defence of his novel theory will be the most interesting aspect of Punishment."

My thanks to the University of Amsterdam's School of Law!

. . . for hosting my visit to speak at their conference on "Private Law and the Basic Structure of Society" alongside several of my philosophical heroes, including Samuel Freeman, Arthur Ripstein and Samuel Scheffler. Information about the event held last week can be found here and I expect there may be plans to publish the papers shortly. A fascinating topic that I had not worked on before, but has caught my attention now...

Getting clear about "Punishment": a response to Michael Davis

Introduction
While many an author may hope for positive feedback about a new book, there is something very special when such a hope comes true. I have been enormously proud of the strong endorsements and reviews of my book, Punishment, with more to come including a forthcoming special issue. Punishment is an award winning book launched in the Houses of Parliament. My central contribution of a new "unified theory of punishment" is included in the top 100 Big Ideas for the Future in British universities by Research Councils UK and acknowledged as an idea that will have "a profound effect on our future"-- you can hear me discuss the book in this interview with Robert Talisse at New Books in Philosophy here.

It came as a surprise when I discovered a disappointing review by Michael Davis in the online Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews--and my disappointment stems from his serious misreading of the book that left me in disbelief about a number of claims warranting a response.

My response aims to clarify what I see as the larger problems arising from Davis's review and not exhaustive of my disagreement with his comments about my book.

Problem 1

Davis's mistakes begin from his claims about the first pages of my book:

Brooks' lack of clarity begins with his explanation of what constitutes a theory of punishment. Drawing on H. L. A. Hart, Brooks says, in effect, that any theory of punishment consists of a) a definition of punishment, b) a general justifying aim of punishment, and c) a distribution of punishment (6). Since Brooks will later discuss "mixed theories", he must allow for more than one general justifying aim (say,both deterrence and condemnation). His "a" should therefore have been "at least one".

Davis is incorrect. My discussion of "mixed theories" includes a chapter on Rawls and Hart, a chapter on expressivism (and communicative theories) and my unified theory of punishment. I argue that Rawls and Hart do not endorse more than one general justifying aim, that expressivism generally collapses into retributivism and so does not endorse multiple aims either, and my unified theory has one--and only one--justifying aim, too. So my claim is consistent with what follows later contrary to Davis's claim.

Problem 2
Davis next criticises my comment in the "Retributivism" chapter where I say that "[perhaps] the most classic version of retributivism is found in the Code of Hammurabi's lex talionis, more commonly known as 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth'" (17). Davis says:

Brooks gives no source for this claim, seemingly taking it as the common wisdom. Yet, even a quick reading of the Code serves to disprove it. True, the Code (§196) does say, "If a [free] man put out the eye of another [free] man, his eye shall be put out" (with the same for "tooth", §200, and even "bone", §197). But the Code has many more provisions that do not seem to fit lex talionis at all."

This is an odd criticism of a passage taken out of context. Davis's presentation suggests my discussion of retributivism is focused on Hammurabi's Code and this is misleading. My discussion is in a section entitled "Retributivism is not vengeance" where I merely note one illustration of why some might think retributivism is akin to vengeance is well-known doctrines like "an eye for an eye" as found in the Code of Hammurabi--and, of course, Davis readily accepts such a comment is found in this Code and so I am correct to make this attribution.

My argument is that this view found in the Code is not a vindication of vengeance and so it is a mistake to think retributivism amounts to vengeance even if you held it accepted "an eye for an eye" doctrine. I mention Hammurabi's Code this one time and nowhere claim all retributivists do or should accept his views however conceived. So Davis's criticism takes my comments out of context and misses the point. This makes all the more curious his claim that this example is evidence for "suggesting careless editing as well as careless writing"--and much worse is to come.

Problem 3
Davis next argues my views on retribution are problematic--this is presented as "[t]he primary failing"--because I fail to discuss "legal retributivism, such as can be found in Herbert Morris's work or my own" where Davis cites himself--and not for the only time in his review. If Davis had read the notes to this chapter, he would see that I acknowledge the distinction between "moral retributivism" and "legal retributivism" and state clearly that "I will discuss legal retributivism in chapter 7" citing my earlier work--and also work by Alan Brudner, for which I have great fondness (220n12).

Problem 4
Davis then asserts that my book "certainly says nothing to suggest that retributivism has been the dominant theory of punishment for several decades now" citing Davis's own work (again) for support.

I make clear that retributivism is a dominant view of punishment. If Davis looked more closely at my chapter on retribution, he would have seen that I start(!) the chapter by saying that retributivism is "the most familiar...theory of punishment" with "a rich, venerable tradition" (15). I argue that not only is retribtivism "the best known" of penal theories; but, in fact, it exercises a "primary hold on us today" that is so powerful that all other theories of punishment "can be seen as a response to it" (34). There is more said in later chapters, too. Nonetheless, it is very curious that Davis could make such a claim with such certainty against so much evidence to the contrary.

Absence 1
One striking absence in Davis's critique of my chapter is no acknowledgement--nor rebuttal--of my criticisms of his earlier work on this subject-matter.

Problem 5
Davis offers further interpretive errors. One mistake is his claim that

Perhaps one reason Brooks overlooked this characteristic of legal retributivism is, oddly enough, that his own "unified theory" seems to require something much like wickedness in all crimes (a rights violation).

This statement is divorced from about everything I say in the book. I argue against Legal Moralism from my first chapter because I claim that punishment can only be justified in relation to crimes and not immorality. (I use evil and wickedness alternatively as synonyms to avoid repetition of language when critiquing Legal Moralism--Davis appears to overlook this and think I have some odd, even old fashioned, cariacture of retributivism in mind which I do not.) So my unified theory is deeply opposed to the view that wickedness, or immorality more broadly, can justify punishment and it is striking that Davis could miss a claim made at several points throughout the book.

My view does link punishment with the protection of rights understood as substantial freedoms. Davis's error seems to be in assuming that rights are moral in nature and not political. But this overlooks the Hegelian roots of my position that should be clear throughout--and not least because I am explicit about developing a unified theory inspired by earlier work examining theories of punishment by Hegel and British Idealists. (A more minor mistake by Davis is his example of driving on an expired license as a case my view of punishment cannot account for because it is not a substantial freedom, but this is not obvious to me and I don't see why such freedom of movement is clearly at odds with my theory.)

Problem 6
Davis criticises my analysis of punishment as "not clearly penal" citing an example of a violent psychopath (140-141). Davis says:

"The question, however, is not whether he should be locked up but whether he should be punished. Even if the aim of punishment is to restore or protect rights, it does not follow that every act of restoring or protecting rights is punishment."

This is another mistake. While Davis notes my following Hart in claiming that punishment is only justified for criminal violations, Davis overlooks the fact I endorse a view of punishment as a response to crime that may take the form of a fine and/or imprisonment (and sometimes both) in rejection of Feinberg's separation of penalties from punishment (as "hard treatment"). Perhaps Davis was unconvinced, but it remains striking he overlooked such a prevalent feature of my analysis--which would help him understand the claims I make about "punishment" (understood as a response to crime) throughout the book.

Problem 7
It may now be clear that Davis does not engage with most of my book(!). There is nothing said about my chapters on deterrence, rehabilitation, restorative justice, expressivism, etc. Davis says about part 3 of my book containing four chapters on capital punishment, juvenile offending, domestic violence and sex crimes is:

Brooks has a good deal to say about some of these other modes of enforcement, especially in Punishment's second half. That is one of the attractions of the book. My only objection to these digressions into general enforcement is that they are digressions, not anything relevant to punishment theory as such, even according to the unified theory.

This is striking because these chapters offer a wide range of philosophical material about issues such as whether retributivists should oppose capital punishment, whether age should matter in determining punishments and how this should be considered, how to best understand domestic violence as well as how best to respond and many other issues. These chapters demonstrate that different theories about punishment may have very different things to say not only in principle, but also in application with surprising results. I also make clear why the unified theory--my unique contribution to these debates-- is a better guide to how each of these very different areas should be addressed than alternatives.

Absence 2
While Davis finds nothing of importance in my part 3, it is striking that he is again silent on my criticisms about his earlier work on rape.

Problem 8
Now we turn to Davis's final comments:

Which brings me back to the conclusion of Punishment quoted at the beginning of this review: "If you care about justice, then you should care about punishment" (216). The book's index has no listing for "justice" and, in fact, there is no attempt anywhere in the book explicitly to connect the unified theory with justice. There are only many brief references to "desert", mostly in asides critical of (moral) retributivism.

Davis is incorrect yet again. I defend a particular view about justice--"the idea of the stakeholder society"--which is first presented in the chapter about my unified theory (see 146) and repeatedly highlight the central importance of stakeholding for any theory of punishment with further prominence in my chapter on youth offending. My view of stakeholding is an explicit development of Rawls's views on reciprocity--and I use the example of a property-owning democracy as an illustration of stakeholding (181)--and "one such view about justice" (216). So it is incorrect that the unified theory is nowhere connected with justice: it is and with the idea of the stakeholder society.

I discuss "justice" dozens of times throughout the book, including references to political and public justice, criminal justice and not least restorative justice. Furthermore, "desert" is discussed in dozens of places as well across a variety of contexts and not only in relation to "(moral) retributivism" which leaves me highly confused with why Davis makes such claims.

Conclusion
I am left puzzled by Davis's review that makes several problematic claims offered with notes primarily citing to his previous work and silent on all of my critical commentary about his own work. While no author can expect to convince every reader, it is disappointing to find so many problems in such a review and I hope this response makes clear why.

 

The "Life in the United Kingdom" Citizenship Test: The Case for Reform

. . . is the tentative title for my forthcoming lecture to the Institute of Applied Ethics at the University of Hull next month. Further details can be found here. Not to spoil the talk, but my paper will reveal new problems uncovered with the UK's citizenship test and recommendations on how they might be addressed.

Talking immigration to the UK

. . . one of the hottest topics in British politics as well. Listen to an interview and discussion with me on BBC Radio Newcastle (@bbcnewcastle) -- (from 01.09.00) - http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01nh4nn -- and taking calls!

Happy New Year!!

Wishing readers a joyous and prosperous new year!!! Most of this week will be spent clearing my desk of reference requests and completing applications, but expect more soon -- including a 30 minute live interview with BBC Radio Newcastle set for later this week...

Study for a PhD in Law - Durham University

Durham University is now advertising three PhD studentships -- the deadline is 5pm on Monday, 17 February 2014. There are also AHRC and ESRC studentship opportunities. More information about applications can be found here:  https://www.dur.ac.uk/law/postgraduate/finances/funding 

Durham Law School has over 40 full-time members of staff including several working in legal and moral philosophy that may be available to supervise new students. The Law School is one of the highest ranked in the UK supporting six active research centres across a variety of areas with links across several research institutes at the university.

Interested readers should contact me for more information about studying for a PhD in Law at Durham Law School from autumn 2014.

 

"Polish precedent" won't work to forecast future EU migration

My latest piece for The Conversation can be found HERE.

SURVEY: Who is the worst Tory minister?

Survey HERE  -- results up shortly!

Policy Proposal #5: Hate Crime Register

My policy proposal #5 for the Labour Party 2015 Manifesto - launch a hate crime register

Summary: Recommendation that Labour supports the creation of a Hate Crime Register identifying persons convicted of committing hate crimes

Proposal:  Labour should support the creation of a new Hate Crime Register. Its purpose would be akin to the sex offenders register. The latter provides a list of persons identified as sex offenders where appearing on this register renders them ineligible for certain occupations, such as working with children in schools.

A Hate Crime Register would fulfill a similar aim. It would identify persons convicted of hate crimes with the purpose of rendering them ineligible for similar, if not the same, types of employment and other opportunities.

One aim is to help make communities safer. A further aim is to communicate a stronger deterrent.

See more at YourBritain website.

Policy Proposal #4: Give victims greater voice in sentencing decisions

Policy Proposal #4 for the Labour 2015 General Election Manifesto:

Criminal justice suffers from a lack of public confidence. It is easy to see why.

The legal system can appear an unwelcome place where the victim – and not the offender – is truly on trial. Many victims unsurprisingly report dissatisfaction with their treatment. Sometimes they feel like bystanders in trials they might have affected them profoundly.

This problem is not an accident. The trial is designed so that justice is impartial, but must this require we silence victims about sentencing decisions?

The issue raises an important anomaly. While victims can provide crucial evidence in favour of an offender’s conviction, victims’ voices are often silenced when we consider sentencing options.

Most criminal cases – over 90 per cent – never go to a full trial. Offenders plead guilty and a sentence is passed. Victims lack their day in court to express openly the wrongs they have endured and their views about moving forward in the name of swift justice.

Our challenge is improving public confidence in criminal justice without alienating victims further. In fact, we can make this system better by giving victims a greater voice in sentencing decisions.

Restorative justice is an approach revolutionising criminal justice. It is many things criminal justice is not. Whereas criminal justice is formal, rule-laden and conducted in court by legal professionals, restorative justice is informal, flexible and conducted by ordinary citizens. The object is to ‘restore’ the law-abiding status of a fellow citizen.

Restorative justice allows victims to tell offenders the real impact of the crime, to get answers to their questions and receive an apology. It also gives offenders a chance to understand the true impact of their actions and do something constructive to repair the harm they have caused. This is often done in a conference-like setting where the victim and offender meet. Restorative justice is a promising way to achieve more effective criminal justice.

Evidence suggests victims and offenders alike report higher satisfaction with restorative meetings. Restorative justice has reduced reoffending by up to 25 per cent in contrast to alternative measures. And there is welcome news for any government interested in making savings as at least one study found £9 could be saved for every £1 spent through restorative justice.

This success is a product of hearing more voices. Victims can express the impact of crimes on them and this communicates an important message to offenders they need to hear. One central way to reduce future reoffending is to make perpetrators more aware about the harm they cause.

But offenders benefit as well because we hear their voice, too. This can help identify not only what steps they might take to address their past crimes, but also how we might help them overcome future criminality. This is because we can better target the needs of victims and offenders through a restorative conversation about the past with a view to the future.

But there remains a serious hurdle for extending the benefits of restorative justice more widely. This hurdle is that the current practice of restorative justice does not include imprisonment as a possible option. This limits its applicability to cases of relatively minor crimes and youth offenders.

Some argue the public simply won’t support their greater use. The worry is restorative justice might be seen as a ‘soft touch’ where offenders might ‘escape prison’.

This rests on two mistakes. The first is thinking what people want is harsher, not better, justice. If restorative justice can effectively reduce reoffending and criminal costs while improving victim satisfaction, then this is an approach that can win public confidence.

The second mistake is failing to include a greater punitive element in restorative justice, or what I call ‘punitive restoration‘. If victims, in line with magistrates, have some power over the offender’s punishment, including suspended prison sentences, restorative conference could be used more widely and could help further reduce reoffending.

Victims have a say on outcomes in restorative meetings and the effects have been highly promising. It is time to expand the range of possible outcomes to include a more punitive element. This can ensure restorative justice is not seen as an easy option without undermining the success this approach might build on further.

We can and should improve public confidence in criminal justice by giving victims a greater voice in sentencing decisions through a restorative justice model. Justice need not require victims are silenced, only that they don’t have the only say. Restorative conferences and punitive restoration offer an important new perspective on how justice can be achieved.

See ProgressOnline piece here and YourBritain website.

CFP: Global Justice and Global South

CFP: Global Justice and the Global South

April 25-27, 2014
 Nyaya: The Global Justice Programme at the University of Delhi  In partnership with the Macmillan Global Justice Program, Yale University & Centre for the Study of Global Ethics, University of Birmingham Overview: Nyaya: The Global Justice Programme at the University of Delhi, has been launched in part as a means of bringing more South scholars and students into the global justice dialogue, as well as to increase opportunities for engagement and networking in South countries for theorists and students worldwide.

Nyaya’s inaugural conference will be held April 25-27, 2014 at the University of Delhi. It will bring together global justice theorists, philosophers, development scholars and NGO representatives from South and North countries to present original work and share their views on key issues. Themes include, but are not limited to, cosmopolitan theory and local traditions, especially in South countries; extreme poverty, social exclusion, health inequalities, human rights, protection from violence, the effects of climate change, illicit financial flows and gendered inequalities.  Participation: Please submit a paper proposal including your name, affiliation and an abstract of 300 words or fewer to globaljustice.du@gmail.com Submissions will be considered continuously until Jan. 15, 2014, and notification of acceptance status will come in most cases within two weeks.

Funding is available for domestic travel for participants in India. A limited number of stipends are available to fund overseas travel for junior scholars. To apply for funding, please submit a CV, your paper abstract and a brief statement (300 words or fewer) of your interest in participating to globaljustice.du@gmail.com

If you have general questions about the conference, please contact Ashok Acharya at aacharya.du@gmail.com or Rosy, Conference Coordinator, at hindurose9999@gmail.com

Conference Organizers:

Ashok Acharya, University of Delhi

Thomas Pogge, Yale University

Luis Cabrera, University of Birmingham