Scheffler on "Immigration and the Significance of Culture"
In our political philosophy reading group today, we read Samuel Scheffler's new essay "Immigration and the Significance of Culture" published in Philosophy & Public Affairs 35(2) (2007). It can be downloaded here.
There was quite a lot that colleagues objected to in the essay, but a major worry concerns a summary of his views at the end of his essay. Scheffler says:
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"The implication of my argument, then, is not that all of the political claims advanced under the heading of cultural rights or cultural preservation should automatically be dismissed, but rather that those claims should be redescribed in such a way as to make clear the values, ideals, and principles that are at stake. Ver often, I believe, these will turn out to be moral, religious, or philosophical values or ideals, so that the appeal to cultural will turn out to have been redundant ... it may in some cases turn out that there was really no value at all at stake, and that the appeal to culture was sheer bluff: that it was simply an appeal to the brute fact that some people behave in a certain way, which by itself has no normative force" (p. 124).
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I would be interested to hear what others make of this statement, but let me first offer a few observations. In essence, Scheffler's argument is that what is of value about culture is not culture itself, but certain values that may (or may not) be present in a given culture. The suggestion is that rather than honour claims from culture, we should honour claims from values: "culture" should then drop from view.
I would be interested to hear what others make of this statement, but let me first offer a few observations. In essence, Scheffler's argument is that what is of value about culture is not culture itself, but certain values that may (or may not) be present in a given culture. The suggestion is that rather than honour claims from culture, we should honour claims from values: "culture" should then drop from view.
This is a very curious understanding of culture. If I am a part of a culture and find significant a particular way of life relating to this culture, then it is unclear which parts of the culture I honour (or do not honour) based upon which foundational values are worthy (or not worthy) of recognition. It strikes me that "culture" comes to us as a package, perhaps as a package of values rooted in a distinctive way of life. It is a whole, rather than a variety of unconnected parts. Thus, a claim from culture does not pick and choose amongst a variety of values, but takes them together. As a result, Scheffler's view of culture then strikes me as a bit too fast and loose in its efforts to set culture aside.
Again, I would be very interested to hear what readers think of what is surely an important essay.
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4 comments:
I happen to like this approach to cultures, which, like worldviews, can't be assessed as true or false in toto, rather, one has to examine the specific beliefs, values, interests, perceptions and practices that make them up, any one of which we may, upon close scrutiny and reflection, decide is irrational, should be trumped by other considerations, and so forth. The fact that one may think of one's culture as a whole, in no way means that this should have normative import when it comes to "political claims advanced under the heading of cultural rights or cultural preservation" (think here of footbinding or female genital mutilation, or sati and the various beliefs and values associated with same). The meaning of cultural phenomena is grounded in norms and values that govern our ways of thinking and acting and these should be subject to, first, sensitive (empathetic) conceptual description and elucidation, and then, evaluation (the source of the evaluative criteria is not a subject I discuss now) which means not accepting culture qua culture but investigating its specific rules, norms, values and so on. To analytically examine the parts of a whole is not to thereby dismiss or set aside the (functional role of the) whole. Without having yet read Scheffler's paper, I think his approach makes eminent sense if we are ever to assess the capacity of various resources within a particular worldview (or culture) to rationally, ethically, and creatively respond to various urgent issues, problems and forces, be it nationalism, technological development, public health and general welfare, various kinds of violence, ecological deterioration and devastation, economic development, the recognition of basic human rights, the commodification of values (or virtually everything), global distributive justice, the development and exercise of functions and capacities essential for human flourishing or eudaimonia, and so forth and so on. In examining the parts of a culture we can retain respect for the culture as a whole, indeed, cutlures and worldviews are rather resilient and in any case historicall evolve and change in their constituent parts. Finally, let me say I doubt in many parts of the world privileged by affluence, that anything remotely like a discrete culture exists. Of course this topic is enormously complex, but I've at least offered a few tentative thoughts here, albeit perhaps against the grain. (I can send along a handful of titles that buttress some of my argument should anyone be interested.)
I certainly agree with much of what you say, Patrick. What strikes me as curious in the passage cited above is the following. To take an example, some say that there is no such thing as "society" or "state": instead, what we have is a collection of individuals. We should not then think of these entities as anything but corporatist, as they are simply incorporated by their individual members without any life of their own. However, others argue that this is but one way of thinking about groups. We might think that groups, for example, may have rights: their rights are derived by their members being engaged in a common activity and not something that can be gained outside a group. (Here the work of Peter Jones guides my thinking.)
Scheffler seems to be using "culture" like the old view of "society": in a sense, there is no such thing as culture per se, only a collection of values that may be related to culture (or not related to culture). Culture entirely drops out of the equation: we should only concern ourselves with values, not culture.
One problem with this view may be that it makes culture something it is not: something that is easily reducible to a set of values and no more.
A second potential problem with this view is also that it seems to miss what is of importance to those who find culture important. We may all agree that cultures constantly change over time, but this does not lead us to the view that --- therefore--- if we value our culture, then we should open all barriers to its being engaged with others.
The big gap, I believe, in the paper is that it appears to be making an argument for open borders and takes its start from a consideration of immigration and its effect on the culture of a host state. However, it never gets too deep in these waters.
I apologize for not offering a serious answer to your last query on that recent thread about PublicReason at Crooked Timber. This is a perfect opportunity. Your question here seems to have to do with problems confronted by administrators of constituted authority--the state, the supermarket, the employer--namely what grounds are reasonably available to these administrators to accept or reject requests for special treatment based on culture. For instance, can they throw out the concept and the term "culture" and just deal with "values"? I can see the interest this might have to public administrators or other authorities, but how is it philosophical in any way? While you seem to be taking the standpoint of disembodied reason and asking "what is culture", isn't it really not reason but constituted authority that is doing the talking? The side of authority, and its cultural- and value-underpinnings seems to be unexamined, and the question seems to be merely how far that authority can go in analyzing or dismanteling the claims of the minority claimant. Consequently when you say "culture" isn't reduceable to a set of "values", that may have some importance, say, if some hypothetical judicial review of an issue like the ones you pose, but isn't it really trite in any other context? Enlighten me: What do you take to be the philosophical dimension of this discussion?
No, I'm not sure culture is reducible to a particular set of individual values --- at least if what you suggest bythis is separable individual values. When I claim X as a culture, it strikes me that X is composed of several values (a, b, c). It strikes me that a, b, c together help substantiate the culture: they are linked and intertwined. If so, then it is odd to think we can deal with each value as distinct and separate. This then isn't to say that all values of a culture should be legally protected, but is a modest plea in favour of not letting culture drop out. As I noted at Public Reason:
"I suppose what strikes me is that dropping culture — as Scheffler recommends — in favour of value-talk seems to be a mistake because more than two or more values may be inseparably connected with any claim. Thus, we can’t speak of each value separate to others. What explains the connection between a given set of inseparable values may be its cultural connection. Thinking about the values inherent in culture is surely wise, but not the only object of our concern. These values don’t simply have importance on their own — otherwise we might not have had a culture that combines these values (with others) in unique ways, ways which given meaning to many."
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