Kant reveals postmodernism for what it is
When reading Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, I came across this terrific passage:
"To invent new words where the language already has no lack of expressions for given concepts is a childish effort to distinguish oneself from the crowd, if not by new and true thoughts yet by new patches on an old garment" (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 9 [5:11]).
This may become my new motto!
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27 comments:
Contrast this one: "It is not as easy to invent new words as one thinks, because they are contrary to taste, and in this taste is a hindrance to philosophy." Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, p. 120.
Great find!
A noume-what?
If you're interested in the relationship of Kant to clear language, maybe his exchanges with Hamann would be a good place to start.
Also, fyi, no one really uses the term "postmodernism" anymore, or at least not the continental folks that you're presumably targeting.
Many thanks 3 anonymous and 'no postmodernist yet'. I will comment only on the first and last posts.
On the first, this is a good quote as well although I will have to check the original when I return to the UK later next week. In any event, this passage agrees with my new motto (in CPr) insofar as Kant remains opposed to inventing silly new terms in philosophy in general. (Re: comment three -- this does not imply it is always wrong to come up with a term like 'noumena' once in a while.)
On the last post, yes, I should check out Kant's exchanges with Hamann: thanks for this. I am a bit unclear on the view that no one uses the term "postmodernism" anymore. What else do they call it? Colleagues of mine in political science and law (at least in the UK) continue to refer to this thing called "postmodernism": not all of it is objectionable, but it seems too preoccupied with hero worship, journalism (rather than philosophical analysis), and a strange taste for odd (and unhelpful) new terms to "reveal" what our ordinary language captures more readily and adequately...at least in my view.
Howdy Thom,
I'm a little late to the party, but, in my opinion, I'm not inclined to think Kant's comment is applicable to most work that might fall under the name "post-modern."
I'll take, for example, a thinker I'm not especially fond of, but whom I suspect many think just makes up words and is intentionally obfuscating: Lacan.
When I first approached him, I thought he was putting me on. Once I got more comfortable with his intellectual heritage (from both the French Hegelian tradition and from psychoanalysis), I was able to see that even though I don't especially have a taste for his style, his style isn't without merit from his perspective. It certainly isn't "childish", and despite my disagreement with his approach and substance, he's not just "inventing new words where the language already has no lack of expression."
Finally, I'd like to suggest that no thinking tradition, within or without philosophy, lies outside the reach of Kant's jab. But these jabs seem to me to usually just be ways of dismissing the foreign and unfamiliar. My $.02 cents.
Thanks for your $0.02, Josh. Is then your claim Lacan makes sense if you are able to understand his peculiar terminology? If so, then I think Kant's 'jab' still hits the mark.
Note that the problem is not that some philosophers use specialized jargon --perhaps we all do-- but that some use it wholly unnecessarily, perhaps in an attempt (in fact) to 'conceal' rather than 'reveal' (as this 'tradition' would see it...).
Regarding concealing and revealing, recall the famous couplet: Novum in vetere latet, vetus in novo patet.
Yes, yes...
"Is then your claim Lacan makes sense if you are able to understand his peculiar terminology? If so, then I think Kant's 'jab' still hits the mark" and "Note that the problem is not that some philosophers use specialized jargon [...] but that some use it wholly unnecessarily..."
For these two statements to make sense logically, you are claiming that Lacan purposefully invented words which added nothing to the clarity of his philosophy once one understands them (therefore, it's "wholly unnecessary").
Is that your claim? And if so, have you really read Lacan? Can you tell us who you would include in this list of postmodernists?
I'm not sure how we distinguish those thinkers who neologize, etc. wholly unnecessarily from those who do so for a good reason.
In the continental tradition, or at least in the writings of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, one finds careful reflection on why philosophy must be communicated in a certain form (here, I'm thinking of Hegel on the "speculative sentence" or Nietzsche on his own use of aphorisms), or even in a certain language (for example, Heidegger's weird remarks about the Latinization of Greek philosophy). The specific arguments of these different thinkers might fail, but they should probably be dealt with individually rather than grouping them all together under a common rubric like "obscurantism."
Similarly, Derrida reflects on his own style in "The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations." I'm not sure if Lacan does the same, but insofar as so much of his work (both critical and clinical) addresses problems of figurative language, it's difficult to assume that his style was only a matter of perversity.
How exactly do we determine who's trying to fool us and who's trying to communicate an idea through a complicated, but necessary, form? Presumably something of, e.g., Plato's ideas is lost when we remove them from their dialectical presentation.
I'm not trying to institute anything like a "heresy of (philosophical) paraphrase," but I do think that one ought to take specific philosophers' arguments for their stylistic choices seriously.
Am I particularly thinking of Lacan and co. here? No. What I am criticizing can be found in any number of French philosophers over the past few decades, but it is not an affliction that they might have alone, but one that is shared by a great many others. Ultimately, I'd say this: my target is the same that Harry Frankfurt identifies in his brilliant essay "On Bullshit."
Too many of the discussions of the poverty of "theory," or "postmodernism," or whatever seem to come from people whose only exposure to it has been the editorial pages of the popular press. I've worked on Kant for years and I've learned a lot about his work from Derrida, Lyotard, Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy, etc.
Perhaps you could provide a specific example or two of the pomo malaise that would help clear things up. Or, if you can't, perhaps you could suggest a text that deals critically with the specific arguments of one of the figures who, I assume, are implicated in the charge of being a "hindrance to philosophy."
My specific example detailing the problem and its solution are offered by Harry Frankfurt, noted in my last comment.
OK, I'll read Frankfurt's book as soon as I've completed Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and The Matrix and Philosophy.
My point was just that, if you're going to dismiss a huge chunk of contemporary thought, you need to specify your targets. "Postmodernism," like "political correctness" and so many other terms that may have had a meaning a decade or two ago, doesn't cut it if you haven't actually read Derrida, Deleuze, and so on.
I happily grant that terms/names get used and abused too often. However, figures like Derrida and Deleuze remain on the edges of the profession, and colleagues (for the most part) with interests in these and related figures compose a small minority of our profession. And rightly so.
Thom, your inability to find that communicative zone between hyperbole and simple evasion is really quite frustrating.
You have a blog which, for one reason or another, attracts readers. Rather than simple polemic, perhaps you can take a bit of time and actually develop an argument displaying something like the academic rigour demanded by the profession.
Thanks for comments, Mark. For one thing, I don't think I need be reminded about what the "profession" requires given my position. In my view, postmodernists have contributed little, if anything, to the profession. We rarely find postmodernism in the pages of Ethics, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Journal of Philosophy, and elsewhere and for good measure. I found what I thought was a fitting passage not unrelated to much of what is wrong with postmodern writings in Kant and posted it tongue-in-cheek on this blog. Several found the humour, a few took it all too seriously.
Since Kant was not here offering any particular treatise on the failings of postmodernism---nor was I---I don't see why "the profession" or anyone else has any demands for me to spell out my full views here, today. (Not least as I have four journal articles to referee today on topics as diverse as Hegel's philosophy, global justice, jurisprudence, and political philosophy.) I may well say more in future posts, but do search past posts for "postmodernism" and you will find I believe more than enough.
Thom, first, flexing the fact that you have a "position" is just silly and does nothing for discussion. You can continue doing it if you like, but I suspect most people will find it hard to take comments that start in that way seriously.
If it was simply tongue-and-cheek, that's fine. Your responses to the comments caused people to think that it was something more than that though (by the way, I would have said "a few found the humour, several took it too seriously"). Instead, it seemed as if you have access to some knowledge which is able to simply dismiss a range of writers from across disciplines, around the world. This has to be based on something more than Kant's silly quote and falling for the "myth of prolepsis".
In any case, I read the first page of the archive of posts which contain the word "postmodernism," and it was as barren of actual content as this post was (I'm certainly not saying all your posts are like that - just on this topic). That is, in fact, why I posted my last comment.
I certainly wasn't demanding that you "today" post an essay-like attack on "postmodernism." But if this is a belief of yours, you should at least attempt to push it with some force in the market of ideas.
What?!?! I am flexing absolutely nothing about my having a position!!! I only wanted to remind you that I know plenty about the "profession" (and its being over-professionalized by a minority). Nothing more.
More than just a few found the humour: you make the mistake of thinking I only get feedback on comments to this thread. Instead, I'm most often contacted by email. I've even been sent books (see more recent posting)!
It is not simply the case of just me (and on my own) "dismissing" postmodernism. It is a minor philosophical movement and rightly so. If, as a member of this small community, you believe it should be granted greater attention, then perhaps there is at least some onus on you to demonstrate why.
In the (wonderful American phrase) "marketplace of ideas," the ideas I might be said to "shop around" pertain to graduate student advice on publishing and job hunting, as well as new currents in higher education in the UK, US, and elsewhere. The blog has posted on postmodernism, but it has never been a particular focus and will not be...not least because I don't care for it at all.
My apologies for not offering as much detailed criticisms of postmodernism over the years as you would fancy. Perhaps you should start a blog that defends the faith? Postmodernism has more critics than just Brian Leiter, myself, and others....
Thom, I'm not a "postmodern." My only interest is in the proliferation of actual content, and this is why I posted. You wrote something that I (and others) felt could perhaps be explained a bit further. That is my position, but it's not one your amiable to, so I'll let you continue with your mission ("postmodernism watch").
Most of the people presumably associated with this criticism don't concern themselves with the invention of "words" but with the invention of concepts, which is an entirely different matter... and something anglophone "critics" rarely come to grips with.
I don't know if this is entirely correct, Rodrigo. Too often what I've seen is simply old wine in new bottles...in the best of cases.
Well the difficulty here is in understanding whats being expressed in a concept. If a concept contains no essential internal variations from something existent then its not a new concept and a new word would be unnecessary right? However if one develops a concept of something whose internal component and consistency is essentially something different than an existent concept, one either has the option of using an existent "word" to express the difference in concept (and say e.g. that previously people used this word in this way, but the concept is more adequately understood as _____) or they can develop a new word to correspond to the new concept. I'd say that over 95% of people I've seen commenting on or criticizing philosophical neologism in particular dont sufficiently understand what concept their criticizing. That includes the Sokals and those that have mimed their critique. Their presupposition is elsewhere. That people simply want to sound fancy or different or that they want to scientifize their language. While the real issue is where there is something expressible that a dominant discourse and its semiotization fails to express or suppresses. Its essentially a political issue, all of language is.
Thanks for the further clarification, although I would definitely not agree with the last part. Language does not strike me as inherently 'political'.
I do know some who claim that 'the political' is not only language, but also what is 'contested'.
Yet, the problem then is, well, what we mean by 'the political' becomes everything. Literary criticism becomes political: it is language; it contests. This seems straightforwardly wrong.
Politics relates to institutions. Many forms of contestation and uses of language pertain to institutions either directly or indirectly. These forms and uses might be characterized as 'political', but nothing more.
RE: "Politics relates to institutions." Well, I can only say that from my perspective, once one gets beyond a "signifying formalism" with respect to language, you have to see that all language is political. Because what is represented, and how something is represented is either a challenge or an acquiescence to a dominant signifier or signifying regime. Language is not composed of "words" first and foremost. It is constructed on top of signs. All living organism deal with "signs" as one notes if you explore biosemiotics. It is thus ontologically prior for us than are "words". Words overcode signs, sometimes to the point where we forget that we can experiment with or interpret differently what dominant significations have normalized. The overcoding happens twice (first with the controling of intensive units, and secondly with the construction of expressive redundancies), these are two consequences of Power or Authority. Maybe you see things differently, but for me, when there are power-relations involved, I see that as "political". Anyway, thats just my 2 cents.
I am afraid we may be using different currencies!!
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