. . . is available here and forthcoming at Law and Philosophy. The abstract:
millions of people around the world are unable to meet their needs on their own,
and do not receive adequate protection or support from their home states. These
people, if they are to be provided for, need assistance from the international
community. If we are to meet our duties to these people, we must have ways of
knowing who should be eligible for different forms of relief. One prominent
proposal from scholars and activists has been to classify all who are unable to
meet their basic needs on their own as 'refugees,' and to extend to them the
sorts of protections established under the United Nations Refugee Convention.
Such an approach would expand the traditional refugee definition significantly.
Unlike most academic commentators discussing this issue, I reject calls for an
expanded refugee definition, and instead defend the core elements of the
definition set out in the 1967 Protocol to the United Nations Refugee
Convention. Using the tools of moral and political philosophy, I explain in this
article how the group picked out by this definition has particular
characteristics that make refugee protection distinctly appropriate for it.
While many people in need of assistance can be helped 'in place', in their home
countries, or by providing a form of temporary protected status to them, this is
not so, I show, of convention refugees. The group picked out by the UN refugee
definition is a normatively distinct group to whom we owe particular duties,
duties we can only meet by granting them refuge in a safe country. Additionally,
there are further practical reasons why a broader refugee definition may lead to
problems. Finally, I argue that rejecting the call for a broader definition of
refugees will better help us meet our duties to those in need than would an